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Background: Newly established high-technology areas such as eHealth require regulations regarding the interoperability
of health information infrastructures and data protection. It is argued that government capacities as well as the extent to
which public and private organizations participate in policy-making determine the level of eHealth legislation. Both
explanatory factors are influenced by international organizations that provide knowledge transfer and encourage private
actor participation.
Methods: Data analysis is based on the Global Observatory for eHealth - ATLAS eHealth country profiles which summarizes
eHealth policies in 114 countries. Data analysis was carried out using two-component hurdle models with a truncated
Poisson model for positive counts and a hurdle component model with a binomial distribution for zero or greater counts.
Results: The analysis reveals that the participation of private organizations such as donors has negative effects on the
level of eHealth legislation. The impact of public-private partnerships (PPPs) depends on the degree of government
capacities already available and on democratic regimes. Democracies are more responsive to these new regulatory
demands than autocracies. Democracies find it easier to transfer knowledge out of PPPs than autocracies. Government
capacities increase the knowledge transfer effect of PPPs, thus leading to more eHealth legislation.
Conclusions: All international regimes – the WHO, the EU, and the OECD – promote PPPs in order to ensure the
construction of a national eHealth infrastructure. This paper shows that the development of government capacities in the
eHealth domain has to be given a higher priority than the establishment of PPPs, since the existence of some (initial)
capacities is the sine qua non of further capacity building.
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Capacity developmentIntroduction
This paper analyzes the factors that enable or impede
the legislation of national eHealth infrastructure. In par-
ticular, it examines the role and effects of stakeholders
such as companies or private donors on the legislation of
national health infrastructures. The question of whether
the participation of private organizations enhances the
capacity of national governments to regulate these eHealth
infrastructures is raised. Furthermore, this paper asks if
the participation of private organizations makes a differ-
ence for autocratic or democratic regimes, and whether
the participation of private organizations increases theCorrespondence: achim.lang@uni-konstanz.de
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orgoverning capacities of resource-poor governments, lead-
ing to more legislation.
The participation of stakeholders in policy-making is
seen as an enabling instrument to successful policy im-
plementation. It is particularly important when govern-
ments do not have the capacity to act or regulate the
matter due to absent knowledge or resources. This be-
comes even more serious in the case of developing coun-
tries. International organizations such as the WHO, the
OECD, and the European Commission strongly encourage
the involvement of non-state actors in order to increase
the knowledge base in policy-making. Stakeholder partici-
pation is said to compensate for the lack of government
capacity by providing expertise on particular issues. How-
ever, policy scientists point out that not only does low gov-
ernment capacity constrain the ability to set up legislation,is is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
rg/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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participating stakeholders in domestic policy-making and
policy implementation may lead to mounting complexity
concerning the policy process [1-5]. In such complex set-
tings, regulatory decisions are less likely [6-8].
This paper seeks to shed light on this paradoxical situ-
ation and tries to determine if the participation of stake-
holders increases the capacities of governments or if
they increase policy-subsystem complexity. I argue that
the participation of stakeholders increases government
capacities to regulate health infrastructures under the
condition that these governments already possess some
capacities. This argument is based on the assumption
that governments have to acquire expertise from other
organizations or from experiences gained by providing
health infrastructures or in the legislation of other branches
of the economy. In order to regulate health infrastructures,
governments that already have some experience in regula-
tory matters find it easier to set-up legislations than govern-
ments with little or no expertise.
The impact of stakeholder participation is tested in the
case of eHealtha, which has become an important topic
for the provision and coordination of health care in de-
veloped as well as developing countries. eHealth refers to
“health services and information delivered or enhanced
through the Internet and related technologies. In a broader
sense, the term characterizes not only a technical develop-
ment, but also a state-of-mind, a way of thinking, an atti-
tude, and a commitment for networked, global thinking,
to improve health care locally, regionally, and worldwide
by using information and communication technology” [9].
eHealth applications include, to name just a few, electronic
health records in which all diagnoses and medical treat-
ments are stored, mobile interfaces between patients and
physicians, and decision support systems that provide im-
mediate information and feedback to physicians during
consultations and treatments.
eHealth has generated high hopes within international
organizations, in particular the WHO, the OECD and
the European Commission. The use of ICT is expected to
result in higher efficiency, increased profits, lower costs,
and better quality for the user. eHealth is widely viewed as
an all-purpose measure to alleviate health inequalities in
developing countries and to bring health care to even the
most remote villages. In industrialized OECD and EU
countries, eHealth is expected to increase coordination
between the specialized medical professions.
The application of ICT in health care delivery rests on
the ability of governments and international organizations
to provide and regulate interfaces as well as interoper-
ability standards between hospitals, physicians, sickness
funds, government agencies, and above all, patients [10].
Additionally, legislations must ensure that the use of
eHealth services meets privacy requirements.The paper proceeds as follows. The next section out-
lines policy instrument choice in a multi-level polity and
focuses on the role of stakeholders – private enterprises,
donors and public-private partnerships (PPP) – in affect-
ing government capacity. The third and fourth sections
provide information about data collection and statistical
models. It is followed by an analysis of eHealth policies
in 114 countries. And finally, the conclusion summarizes
the findings.
The choice of legislation in a multi-level policy regime
The choice and scope of legislations is a highly con-
strained enterprise that involves choices at different levels
of the policy-making architecture [11]. Howlett basically
distinguishes between three regime levels in a nested pol-
itical setting. These levels include international regimes,
the national policy regime, and the sectoral policy regime.
At the international level, generic governance modes
determine macro policy goals and general implementation
styles, with the effect that different governance modes gen-
erate different preferences for policy instruments. These
governance modes are compatible with certain macro-
policy objectives or “policy paradigms” [12]. Macro-policy
paradigms are not only time-dependent, but they also de-
pend on incorporation into international regimes. Their
scope and degree of authority limits the choices available
to state governments, as well as changes the preferences of
domestic actors regarding different policy tools. They pro-
vide interpretive frameworks, which structure cognitive
processes as well as the terminology of political communi-
cation [13]. An international regime essentially denotes a
“set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and de-
cision making procedures around which actors’ expecta-
tions converge in a given area of international relations”
(Krasner 1983: 2). The basic elements of international re-
gimes consist of institutions that regularize actor partici-
pation and expectations. Rules and norms have become
central tenets of international regime literature [14-16].
Norms and rules put forth by international regimes are re-
lated to this selection process in how they affect capacity
building in member states and stakeholder participation.
Most, if not all international health regimes have been de-
signed to assist member states in tackling health issues
and to provide them with the means to do so. This in-
cludes advice and recommendations as well as financial
assistance. Rather frequently, it also includes the participa-
tion of a diverse set of organizations in the formulation
and execution of public policies.
Many international eHealth regimes have been set-up
in the last two decades. The World Health Organization
(WHO), the European Union (EU) and the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
provide the most advanced efforts to structure member
state activities in the eHealth domain (Table 1).
Table 1 International eHealth regimes
WHO OECD EU
Norms Origin Millennium development goals Science and technology policy Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs
Problem
perception
Fighting poverty and poor health;
insufficient resources in
developing countries
Insufficient coordination between
state agencies; insufficient
ICT infrastructure
Ageing societies; increasing costs
Objectives Advice and recommendations regarding
knowledge/technology; cooperation
between public and private actors
Technology diffusion; higher quality
health care; establishing the market
for eHealth solutions
Driver for economic growth; more
efficient and higher quality of health
care delivery; market creation
Rules Procedures Supporting activities of the WHO; WHO
works with other IOs
Commissioned evaluation reports;
workshops with member
country reps.
Participation open to member states
(and sometimes to stakeholders)
Actors States, stakeholders States, stakeholders States, stakeholders
Policy
instruments
Benchmarking by WHO, standard setting,
coordination of standardization organizations,
policy and technology advice, and monitoring
Best practices, policy and
technology diffusion, and
learning between member states
Establishment of standardization projects
for member states, policy and technology
recommendations, priority setting, and
project funding
Lang Globalization and Health 2014, 10:4 Page 3 of 14
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/10/1/4The WHO has long been assisting countries in provid-
ing and purchasing essential health technologies (WHO
2004). A particular emphasis on technology diffusion
became more prominent after the elaboration of the
Millennium Development Goals, which mandated that the
WHO further engage in the diffusion of ICT-related health
activities in developing countries [17]. In 2005, the World
Health Assembly adopted the WHO eHealth resolution
(WHA58.28), which noted the high salience of the eHealth
issue and prospective benefits of eHealth to health care
delivery, public health, health research, and health-related
activities (WHA58.28: 1). Furthermore, it urged member
states to develop a strategic plan, a legal framework
and technical infrastructure (WHA targets) to implement
eHealth services, mobilize participation and coordinate ac-
tivities with stakeholders, establish national centers for co-
ordinating activities and for benchmarking and identifying
best practices (WHA58.28). IT solutions are part of a
larger knowledge management approach that encom-
passes efforts directed at “resource-poor settings”, data
standardization, aggregation and international cooperation
in knowledge-sharing. In order to meet the WHA targets,
the WHO intensified relationships with ICT professional
associations [18,19]b.
In the European Union, eHealth and telemedicine en-
tered the European agenda at the end of the 1990s in the
wake of the “Lisbon strategy” for growth and jobs [20,21].
Information technology was designated to play a vital role
in accomplishing the Lisbon strategy targetsc including the
exploitation of new technologies in health care delivery
(later renamed “eHealth”). In 2008, the Commission an-
nounced plans to make eHealth one of the six EU Lead
Market Initiatives [22] “due to its market potential in terms
of growing demand and market growth opportunities,
changing demographics, disease patterns and healthcare
capabilities” (p. 12). The European Commission policystrategy is embedded in significant research activities that
explore issues of standardization and interoperability. The
lead market initiative features activities on semantic inter-
operability, the development of a roadmap for necessary
policy steps and the establishment of a thematic network
consisting of national health ministries, business associa-
tions and professional groups.
The OECD identified technology diffusion as a major
driver of economic growth, especially in developing coun-
triesd. Broadband policies and national broadband plans
(NBP) have become key areas for the development of the
internet society and e-government. The OECD has pro-
posed recommendations regarding e-government with a
strong emphasis on eHealth [23]. The OECD particularly
acknowledges gains in coordination, efficiency and the
quality of care by increasing the use of information and
communication technologies in health care delivery [24].
Although international regimes were established under
varying circumstances and promoting somewhat differ-
ing ends, their means are highly similar. All international
regimes provide best practices, promote standard-setting
activities and endorse the participation of private actors in
the development of eHealth infrastructure and eHealth
legislation. There are clear policy recommendations pro-
moting the participation of stakeholders in the policy
process. This shift in responsibility is advertised as a lo-
gical result of financial constraints on the part of inter-
national organizations and the need to incorporate (more
resourceful) private actors in the policy process. It is ar-
gued that new technologies spread across developed and
quickly-developing countries, leaving poor countries be-
hind. Stakeholder participation, in this view, provides an
effective means to foster technology uptake even in the
poorest countries, since private organizations are able to
wield the financial resources and knowledge that is often
missing in developing countries [25]. As a result, all forms
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cades and have become preeminent in the field of devel-
opment policy [26].
H1: The participation of private organizations enables
governments to set-up eHealth legislations.
The national policy regime level mediates between
international regime stimuli and sectoral policy-making.
Howlett argues that policy instruments are selected ac-
cording to the norms and rules promoted by international
regimes, but also according to the logic of the prevailing
national mode of governance (Howlett 2009) [11].
At the national policy regime level, a basic distinction
must be made between autocratic and democratic polit-
ical regimes. It is often assumed that democratic regimes
are more responsive to citizen needs and IO demands
while autocratic governments act in favor of the ruling
elites. There are two (not mutually exclusive) explanations
as to why this is the case. Both explanations are rooted in
the public choice argument that public goods such as in-
frastructures must be supplied by the state, since individ-
uals are unable to provide them. In the first variant, the
state’s policy regarding public infrastructure reflects the
citizens’ preferences about the infrastructure and their le-
gislation [27]. In the case of eHealth, it can be assumed
that citizens prefer a regulated eHealth infrastructure since
it could increase health care efficiency and bring health ex-
pertise to even the most remote areas of the country.
Autocratic regimes that are not confronted with the elect-
orate might determine not to build such an infrastructure
or avoid regulating them properly [28]. Another explan-
ation is provided by Deacon [29]. He asserts that the cost-
benefit ratio for elites in an autocratic regime is high, since
the elites have to bear the majority of costs attributed to
public infrastructure, but reap only a small amount of the
benefits. “For non-exclusive public goods, however, the
elite receive only a pro-rata share of the services produced.
Even if the benefits these goods confer are income elastic,
the elite arguably enjoy only a tiny fraction of economy-
wide benefits. The uneven capture of costs and benefits
by the elite causes non-democratic governments to
under-provide public goods relative to democracies”
(Deacon 2003: 7). The literature on the level of legislation
and regime type is still in its infancy. However, there is
a strong indication that autocratic regimes have a lower
level of legislation than democracies [30].
H2: Autocratic regimes have lower levels of eHealth
legislation.
Additionally, preferences regarding market legislation
may have an impact on the governance of technology
uptake in national health systems. Howlett argues thatgovernment preferences in most liberal-democratic coun-
tries are currently molded according to the logic of market
governance “whose goal is the efficient delivery of con-
sumer and capital goods and services through the use of
market-mechanisms” (Howlett 2009: 78) [11]. Other coun-
tries rely on other governance “modi”, in particular, corpor-
atist or etatist forms of governance in which governments
act alone or authorize societal actors to take part in the
decision-making process or even delegate state authority to
them [31-33]. In case of eHealth legislations, it is more
likely that governments relying on market forces prefer not
to regulate ICT infrastructure in health care.
H3: Countries relying on economic liberties have lower
levels of eHealth legislation.
At the sectoral regime level, Howlett distinguishes
between two interlinked sets of factors affecting policy
instrument choice. First, the organizational capacity of
governments to gather knowledge and other resources
to execute and effect changes determines the choice and
calibration of policy instruments. Second, the level of sub-
system complexity involves “the number and types of
actors that governments must affect in designing and
implementing their programs and policies” (Howlett 2005:
43). A high degree of organizational capacity makes it
likely that the government will intervene directly by pro-
viding the public good itself or by setting up legislations
and monitoring agencies. Lower degrees lead to indirect
interventions such as media campaigns or subsidies. The
complexity of policy subsystems determines the degree of
authority that can be exercised by national governments.
Governments that face simple actor settings are able to
directly influence actor behavior, and are therefore more
likely to resort to authoritative policy instruments [7].
This functional perspective on the role of private orga-
nizations is accompanied by critical accounts that stress
the dysfunctional aspects such as project proliferation and
the redundancy of coordination structures. In a meta-
analysis, Buse and Walt enumerate and summarize the ef-
fects of actor participation on national governments [34].
They provide evidence that the large-scale participation of
donor and other private organizations distracts resources
away from national health ministries and other public
health authorities to record-keeping of projects and cop-
ing with the conditionality set by donor/private organiza-
tions. These distracted resources are taken away from
planning efforts and may lead to “institutional destruc-
tion”, which concerns the effects large scale donor partici-
pation has on governmental capacities [35].
However, different types of stakeholder organizations
have different effects on public policy. In particular, private
and donor organizations seem to create negative external-
ities in pursuit of their financial funding and project
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set agenda and priorities for national health care ministries,
which do not necessarily coincide with domestic demands.
Shiffman reports that “funding does not correspond closely
with burden” [38]. In particular, the fight against com-
municable diseases (e.g. Malaria, HIV/AIDS) receives
an unequally higher percentage of funding than non-
communicable diseases (e.g. respiratory infections), al-
though these amount for the majority of disease prevalence
and mortality [38]. He further notes that displacements
from population health and health system funding towards
communicable disease funding have occurred, but overall
increases in funding levels have covered these developments
[39]. Similarly, Esser and Bench analyzed grants to low and
middle-income countries from private organizations and
donors to fight the disease burden. Their study reveals that
donors and private actors are not overly responsive to na-
tional patterns of disease burden, but pursue other health
priorities [37]. Carmignani et al. further investigated the
causes for the shift in donor priorities and concluded that
“greater media coverage increases aid disbursement” (p. 18).
This affects particular diseases with higher morbidity and
mortality as well as infrastructure programs [36].
H4: The participation of private organizations diverts
government activities away from planning and setting up
legislations.
In contrast, PPPs receive favorable recommendations
since they provide platforms for knowledge transfer that
enable public authorities to learn from private organiza-
tions as well as gain experience in crafting and implement-
ing projects. This hands-on experience provides another
source of expertise that enhances public capacities [25,41].
H5: The participation of public organizations in public-
private partnerships (PPPs) enables governments to set up
legislations.
Data
Data analysis is based on the Global Observatory for
eHealth - ATLAS eHealth country profiles which summarize
the second global survey on eHealth that was carried out
from June to December 2009, and which served as the base
for The Global Observatory for eHealth Series. The survey
was developed by the Global Observatory for eHealth with
intensive consultation and input from eHealth experts. In a
way, the first survey on eHealth served as a pre-test in
terms of data collection and management. A pre-test of the
final questionnaire for the second global survey was carried
out in March 2009 covering Canada, Lebanon, Norway, the
Philippines, and Thailand.
According to the WHO Global Observatory for eHealth,
800 eHealth experts in 114 countries participated in the datacollection, ranging from 5 to 15 per country [42]. The Global
Observatory for eHealth implemented a variety of measures
to assure the quality and validity of the expert ratings. The
country experts received detailed instructions to maintain
consistency in the responses and expert teams were assisted
by staff from the WHO regional offices. Additionally, exter-
nal information sources were used in order to validate the
data and resolve contradictions. Since the country experts
were required to reach consensus and come up with a single
response for each question, differences in opinion had to be
settled by determining which response is the most represen-
tative for the country as a whole. As a result regional vari-
ation could not be measured at the country level [43].
However, the Global Observatory for eHealth admits that
“there was significant variation across Member States in the
quality and level of detail in the responses, particularly for
the descriptive, open-ended questions. While survey re-
sponses were checked for consistency and accuracy, it was
not possible to verify the responses for every question” [43].
The questionnaire hosted a collection of three broad
topics with eight items that covered the main aspects of
eHealth legislation:
 Legislation on personal and health-related data: (1)
To ensure the privacy of personally identifiable data;
(2) To protect personally identifiable data
specifically in electronic medical records (EMR) or
electronic health records (HER).
 Legislation for sharing health-related data between health
care staff through EMR/HER: (1) Within the same
health care facility and its network of care providers,
(2) With different health care entities within the
country, (3) With health care entities in other countries.
 Internet pharmacies: (1) Legislation that allows/
prohibits Internet pharmacy operations; (2) National
legislation/accreditation/certification of Internet
pharmacy sites; (3) Legislation that allows/prohibits
Internet pharmacy purchases from other countries.
The response variable was created as an additive index
(including positive entries only).
The questionnaire furthermore contained questions about
eHealth expenditure per function and funding source. This
is taken as an indicator of the activities of different actors
such as public authorities, private organizations, donors and
public-private partnerships. The questionnaire listed six main
functions where different actor categories might be involved:
1. ICT equipment
2. Software
3. Pilot projects
4. Skills training
5. Ongoing support
6. Scholarships
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actor category (including positive entries only). This
index covers the breadth of actor involvement in eHealth
implementation and is used as a proxy for actor partici-
pation. To be sure, it would be preferable to measure
the number of organizations involved in policy-making
and implementation directly as well as the resources
spent. However, such an indicator does not exist and is
almost impossible to construct. This index provides a rea-
sonable proxy for actor participation.
Concept specification for government capacity includes
different dimensions. First, financial resources have to be
considered since the gathering of information [44] and the
elaboration of legislations are resource-consuming efforts.
Government expenditures on health care and average an-
nual government deficits provide indicators for financial
capacities.
Experience in market legislation is another dimension
that is associated with national policy regimes. It indi-
cates whether governments rely on market mechanisms
or on market restrictions. A combined legislation index
from the Economic Freedom of the World database is
used to indicate the intensity of government legislation.
The combined index includes a regulation index for
labor and capital market regulations. It tells us if a coun-
try guarantees property rights but does not restrict eco-
nomic freedoms. The autocracy-democracy distinction is
measured by the Polity IV score, a measure often used in
comparative political studies.
In order to measure the possible autonomy of national
governments, their independence from private donors or
the potential overload of external donor participation, an
indicator for Official Development Assistance (ODA) re-
ceived (% of GNI) is included.
Regarding the regulatory and public policy challenge
in eHealth, two indicators will be included in the analysis.
First, physician density includes the idea that eHealth in
health care is set-up to achieve better coordination be-
tween health care providers and to relieve cost pressures
from health care systems. Population density, in contrast,
refers to the claim that health care should be delivered
even in the most remote areas of a country.
Regarding missing values, multiple imputations from
the “Amelia” package [45,46] in the programming envir-
onment R [47] created 25 different data sets in order to
alleviate the effects of the imputed missing values on the
regression model. The final dataset contains the average
values of all imputed datasetse.
Methods
Data analysis was carried out using hurdle Poisson models
for count data. These are two-component models that con-
sist of a truncated Poisson model for positive counts and a
hurdle component model with a binomial distribution forzero or greater counts [48,49]. The hurdle component ana-
lyzes the binary part of the model for which the dependent
variable is either zero or has a positive value. It therefore
captures the question of if a country has health legislation
at all, irrespective of the total amount of legislation. The
Poisson model considers the count part of the model and
analyzes how many legislations countries have [49]. The
analysis is based on the package “pscl” [50] contained in
the R programming environment.
The principal idea for the hurdle Poisson model is that
there are two different processes at work. The first process
causes the absence or presence of eHealth legislations,
while the second process influences the number of eHealth
legislations. The probability function for a hurdle Poisson
model is built up accordingly. The binomial distribution is
used to model the absence and presence of eHealth legisla-
tions, and a Poisson distribution is used for the counts [51]:
f y; β; γð Þ ¼
f binomial y ¼ 0; γð Þ
1−f binomial y ¼ 0; γð Þð Þ 
f Poisson y; βð Þ
1−f Poisson y ¼ 0; βð Þ
y ¼ 0
y > 0
8<
:
It follows that the probability of measuring no legisla-
tion is modeled with a binomial distribution, where πi is
the probability that yi = 0. πi is modeled in terms of co-
variates Z and regression parameters γ [51]:
πi ¼ e
vþγ1Zi1þ…γqZiq
1þ evþγ1Zi1þ…γqZiq
In order to measure a non-zero count, the government
needs to cross a hurdle to produce a non-zero value
(create legislation) and the Poisson count process has to
exclude the probability of zero values, which is called a
zero-truncated Poisson distribution. The second part in
the first equation means that the probability of measur-
ing a value greater zero equals the probability that it is
not a zero multiplied with the probability determined by
a zero-truncated Poisson. The mean of the Poisson dis-
tribution is modeled in the following way [51]:
μi ¼ eaþβ1Xi1þ…βqZiq
Results
The number of eHealth legislations is unevenly distrib-
uted between OECD/EU and developing countries (see
Table 2). OECD/EU countries have almost four different
eHealth legislations on average (3.79). In contrast, coun-
tries in other parts of the world have only slightly more
than one legislation in the eHealth domain (1.10).
This paper seeks to analyze the drivers of eHealth legis-
lations. The main argument concerns the effects of private
actor participation in government legislation of eHealth
and whether political regimes and governmental capacities
provide different leverage for private actors.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Indicator Mean Std. Min. Max. Source
eHealth legislation (sum of eHealth legislation) 1.81 1.81 0.0 7.0 Global observatory for eHealth - ATLAS eHealth
country profiles
eHealth legislation (OECD/EU countries, N = 29) 3.79 1.66 1 7
eHealth legislation (developing countries, N = 86) 1.10 1.26 0 5
Public actors (no. of eHealth functions) 3.64 2.18 0.0 6.0 Global observatory for eHealth - ATLAS eHealth
country profiles
Private actors (no. of eHealth functions) 1.63 2.15 0.0 6.0 Global observatory for eHealth - ATLAS eHealth
country profiles
Donors (no. of eHealth functions) 2.60 2.40 0.0 6.0 Global observatory for eHealth - ATLAS eHealth
country profiles
Public-private partnerships (no. of eHealth functions) 1.25 1.80 0.0 6.0 Global observatory for eHealth - ATLAS eHealth
country profiles
Government expenditures on health care
(% total expenditures on health)
56.63 18.38 10.50 87.70 WHO World health statistics
Government surplus/deficit (average from 2000–2010) −0.91 4.10 −11.56 14.36 World development indicators
Labor and credit market regulations
(high values = less regulation and restriction)
7.23 1.11 4.50 9.57 Economic freedom of the world http://www.
freetheworld.com/
Net official development assistance (ODA) received (% of GNI) 5.367 10.16 −18.33 73.48 World development indicators
Autocracy-democracy (Polity IV score) 4.12 6.30 −10 10 Polity IV Project http://www.systemicpeace.org/
polity/polity4.htm
Physicians (per 10,000 inhabitants) 15.78 14.207 0.50 53.50 WHO World health statistics
Population density (km2) 197.88 694.89 2.00 7202.00 World telecommunication/ICT indicators database
Note: sum of eHealth legislation means the number of different pieces of legislation that have been enacted (Legislation on personal and health-related data: (1)
To ensure the privacy of personally identifiable data; (2) To protect personally identifiable data specifically in EMR or HER. Legislation for sharing health-related data
between health care staff through EMR/HER: (1) Within the same health care facility and its network of care providers, (2) With different health care entities within
the country, (3) With health care entities in other countries. Legislation on Internet pharmacies: (1) Legislation that allows/prohibits Internet pharmacy operations,
(2) National legislation/accreditation/certification of Internet pharmacy sites, (3) Legislation that allows/prohibits Internet pharmacy purchases from other
countries). The mean value of 1.81 indicates that on average about 2 pieces of legislation have been enacted. The no. of eHealth functions is an additive index
that covers the whole range of functions in which a particular actor, such as donors or PPPs, participates (ICT equipment, software, pilot projects, skills training,
ongoing support, scholarships, etc.). The mean value of 3.64 for public actors indicates that on average public actors are actively implementing about four of
these functions in each country.
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economic challenges regarding the use of eHealth in health
care delivery are considered (see Model 1 in Table 3). Such
factors include the number of physicians in a country and
population density. Regarding the number of physicians,
the coefficients indicate significant and positive effects
on eHealth policies in the model containing all countries,
while coefficients for the non-OECD/EU countries are
positive, yet not significant (see Figure 1). The coefficients
for the zero component have positive values and are highly
significant in every model. This suggests that legislation is
triggered by the need to coordinate the medical profession.
Population density clearly shows a negative relationship
with legislation. Higher densities are accompanied by lower
levels of eHealth legislation. However, this effect is only
present in the all-countries model, but vanishes in the
model containing only non-OECD/EU countries. Thus, the
main rationale for applying eHealth is not so much bring-
ing health care delivery to every part of the country, but in
making health care more efficient and in easing coordin-
ation between health care providers.Model 2 considers indicators of government capacity
(see Table 3). Government expenditures on health care
have a positive and significant effect in all models and
imply that financial assets are the baseline for all govern-
ment activities. In contrast, recent government deficits
as well as a dependency on foreign aid had no impact on
eHealth legislations. The level of economic freedom granted
to other sectors of the economy measures the national pol-
icy style with concern to the legislation of economic activity.
Economic freedoms and legislation seem to be at odds since
there is a negative impact on the number of eHealth leg-
islations. This effect is consistent in all models and
holds true for developed as well as developing countries
(see Figures 1 and 2). An example is the high level of
economic freedom in Switzerland compared with lower
levels in Germany (see Table 4). Compared to other
European countries, Switzerland developed an eHealth
strategy rather late in 2007. Since Switzerland is a federal
state and health care delivery is dominated by private or
local public health care providers, the Swiss central gov-
ernment lacked expertise in coordinating and regulating
Table 3 Hurdle Poisson models for all countries and for non-OECD/EU countries (response variable: eHealth legislation, standard errors in parentheses)
All countries Non-OECD/EU countries
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Count model coefficients (truncated poisson with log link)
(Intercept) 0.03 (0.40) 0.15 (0.69) 0.82 (0.12)*** 0.50 (0.78) 0.33 (0.49) 1.36 (1.13) 0.18 (0.24) 1.81 (1.15)
Physicians per 10,000 inhabitants (log) 0.45 (0.10)*** 0.23 (0.11)* 0.16 (0.12) 0.13 (0.13)
Population Density km2 2007 (log) −0.12 (0.06)* −0.11 (0.06)# −0.11 (0.10)
Government expenditures on health 0.02 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.01)* 0.03 (0.01)** 0.02 (0.01)*
Government surplus/deficit (average from 2000–2010) 0.01 (0.02) −0.04 (0.05)
Economic freedom in labor and credit market
(less regulation)
−0.23 (0.09)** −0.21 (0.09)* −0.51 (0.18)** −0.52 (0.19)**
ODA received −0.01 (0.02) −0.02 (0.03)
Autocracy-democracy (Polity IV score) 0.07 (0.02)** 0.05 (0.02)* 0.04 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03)
Public sector activity 0.08 (0.06) 0.09 (0.11)
Donor activity −0.17 (0.04)*** −0.05 (0.05) −0.14 (0.07)# −0.08 (0.09)
Public-private partnership activity 0.05 (0.05) 0.35 (0.09)*** 0.32 (0.10)***
Private sector activity 0.11 (0.04)* 0.08 (0.04)* −0.18 (0.09)* −0.12 (0.10)
Zero hurdle model coefficients (binomial with logit link)
(Intercept) −0.12 (0.78) 1.51 (1.57) 1.14 (0.35)*** 2.31 (1.69) −0.16 (0.77) 1.33 (1.56) 0.43 (0.39) 1.71 (1.61)
Physicians per 10,000 inhabitants (log) 0.84 (0.17) *** 0.97 (0.22)*** 0.66 (0.18)*** 0.79 (0.22)***
Population density km2 2007 (log) −0.07 (0.18) −0.08 (0.21) −0.05 (0.18)
Government expenditures on health 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
Government surplus/deficit (average 2000–2010) −0.03 (0.06) −0.03 (0.06)
Economic freedom in labor and credit market
(less regulation)
−0.37 (0.26) −0.54 (0.30)# −0.32 (0.26) −0.50 (0.30)#
ODA received −0.05 (0.03) # −0.03 (0.03)
Autocracy-democracy (Polity IV score) 0.12 (0.04) ** 0.12 (0.05)** 0.07 (0.04)# 0.08 (0.05)#
Public sector activity 0.23 (0.12) # 0.23 (0.12)#
Donor activity −0.24 (0.10)* 0.03 (0.13) −0.07 (0.11) 0.03 (0.13)
Public-private partnership activity 0.32 (0.16)# 0.35 (0.17)* 0.26 (0.18)
Private sector activity 0.08 (0.12) 0.04 (0.14) −0.04 (0.14) −0.07 (0.16)
N 114 114 114 114 84 84 84 84
Log-likelihood −180.9 −176.2 −196.8 −162.7 −114.6 −108.2 −113.7 −97.19
Df 6 14 8 16 6 14 8 16
***p < 0.001 **p < 0.01 *p < 0.05 #p < 0.1.
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Figure 1 Effects plots for Model 4. Note: Predicted effects over a range of values with 95% pointwise confidence bands for the mean response
shown as dotted lines.
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http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/10/1/4large infrastructure projects, in particular within the health
care sector [52]. The German central government, in con-
trast, modernized legislation in health care delivery that in-
troduced telematic devices in 2003. The new legislation set
up the institutional framework for the subsequent imple-
mentation of the electronic health card [53]. The legal
guidelines regarding eHealth are modeled after previous
large-scale innovation policy projects in which the federal
government was the driving force behind technology
innovation. The new legislation lists the entire structureand members of the implementation organization as well
as the funding scheme and privacy requirements [54].
Additionally, the organization’s structure allowed for the
participation of a large number of NGOs such as health in-
surance associations, chambers of the medical profession
or ICT business associations.
Another comparison illustrates the differences between
democracies and autocracies in legislating eHealth. Autoc-
racies are less responsive to demands by the international
community and their electorate to set-up adequate eHealth
Figure 2 Effects plots for Model 8. Note: Predicted effects over a range of values with 95% pointwise confidence bands for the mean response
shown as dotted lines.
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http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/10/1/4legislations that enable health care providers to exchange
patient information and guarantee data protection and
privacy. An example is Turkmenistan. In Turkmenistan,
the autocratic government has not identified eHealth as a
major policy area. Neither a policy framework nor a stra-
tegic plan is in place that acknowledges some need to co-
ordinate the medical profession or health care delivery in
this vast country. This lack of policy is in line with the low
efforts being made to modernize the government and pro-
vide an ICT infrastructure for public authorities [55]. Only
recently has there been some movement as international
collaborations regarding e-government, e-education and
e-health have been initiated. India is the primaryTable 4 Statistics for selected countries
No. eHealth policies Government expend
health (% TH
Country Value Rank Value
CHE 2 32 59.6
GER 5 5 75.7
TKM 1 49 52.4
TUR 3 23 75.2collaborator in these matters (The Economic Times,
Sept-18- 2012). In contrast, Turkey has established an
eHealth project and strategy in support of the larger
“Health Transformation Project” of 2003. The eHealth
strategy was designed as a top-down process to establish
guidelines and adopt interoperability standards. The re-
sponsible Turkish Ministry of Health envisaged increas-
ing efficiency and coordination of the delivery of health
care, thereby reducing costs to the health care system.
However, the eHealth project was slowed down due to a
lack of expertise in standards and operability issues. As a
result, the Turkish Ministry of Health made a request to
the ITU to provide assistance in the implementation ofitures on Polity score Economic freedom
E)
Rank Value Rank Value Rank
55 10 1 8.8 10
20 10 1 6.7 78
68 −9 111 6.2 92
24 7 53 5.8 99
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http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/10/1/4the eHealth project [56]. Since January 2009, the national
health information system connects 100% of all Turkish
hospitals that utilize a common electronic patient record
system [57].
Models 3 and 7 include indicators of the policy subsys-
tem. They explore the effect of actor participation on
the degree of eHealth legislation. As it turns out, donors,
private actors and public-private partnerships make a
difference in the policy-making process. However, their
involvement differs for OECD/EU and most developing
countries. In non-OECD/EU countries, private organiza-
tions, donors and PPPs have significant effects on eHealth
legislations, but in opposite directions. The participation
of donors decreases eHealth policy-making (see Figure 2).
However, the effects fall short of reaching an adequate sig-
nificance level if one controls for capacity indicators. This
allows an interpretation that donor participation occurs
essentially in countries with low capacities. Their partici-
pation is not directed toward the establishment of a legal
framework that guarantees interoperability but on the
development of their projects. The same holds true for
private actor involvement, although this effect is also
(slightly) not significant when controlled for the cap-
acity variables. An interpretation might be that private
organizations and donors are principally interested in
carrying out their projects undisturbed by domestic gov-
ernment interference. However, government legislation in-
creases with higher capacities, thus softening business
pressures to neglect eHealth legislations. In contrast, PPPs
have a positive effect on the number of eHealth policies,
but only in non-OECD/EU countries, while there is no ef-
fect in developed countries (see Figure 2). Thus, PPPs en-
able knowledge transfers from private organizations to
public authorities in developing countries.
In order to analyze the effects of PPPs and donor in-
volvement more deeply, Table 5 provides predicted meansTable 5 Interaction of PPP involvement with democracy, econ
eHealth legislation in developing countries
Polity score – Government ex
autocracy vs. democracy health care
PPP Low polity score - High polity score - Low govern.
Autocracy Democracy expenditures on health
(sum) (1st decile) (9th decile) (1st decile)
0 0.60 0.85 0.50
1 0.75 1.17 0.44
2 0.94 1.62 0.39
3 1.18 2.24 0.34
4 1.50 3.10 0.30
5 1.96 4.28 0.26
6 2.61 5.92 0.23from the count component of model 8. It shows the pre-
dicted effects of PPPs for different political regimes and
levels of government capacity. Regarding the difference
between autocracies and democracies, PPP effects for au-
tocracies is about half of the effects for democracies (e.g.
1.18 legislations vs. 2.24 for three PPPs). This allows for
the interpretation that democracies find it easier to trans-
fer knowledge out of PPPs than autocracies. Similarly,
government capacities in health care as measured by gov-
ernment expenditures and the amount of legislations in
other sectors of the economy give us a striking picture.
Government capacities increase the effect of PPPs by
about 40% (for the 9th decile of countries with very high
capacities). If governments have extensive experience in
regulating other sectors, then the additional effect of having
PPPs increase the number of eHealth legislations also by
about 40%. This means that there is an exceptionally high
impact of PPPs when governments already have some ex-
pertise in the health domain or in regulating other sectors.
Macro-political regime characteristics towards more
democracy increase the effects of PPPs. However, regime
characteristics are conceptually and empirically more dis-
tant than actual (sectoral) government capacities or cross-
sectoral experience in regulating economic matters. These
closer factors provide a more fruitful setting in which
knowledge transfer and knowledge creation works better
than in capacity-poor settings.
To sum up, the main arguments of this essay referred to
the participation of private organizations in regulating na-
tional health infrastructures. It was hypothesized that their
participation in domestic policy-making enhances the cap-
acity of national governments to regulate these infrastruc-
tures. This view is consistent with the expectations and
declarations of IOs such as the WHO. In contrast, scholars
of public policy stress that private organizations prefer
to lobby for less legislation. This should be particularlyomic regulation and government health expenditures on
penditures on Labor and credit market
(% of THE) regulations
High govern. Many labor and credit Few labor and credit
expenditures on health market regulations market regulations
(9th decile) (1st decile) (9th decile)
1.18 1.41 0.28
1.63 1.95 0.39
2.26 2.70 0.54
3.13 3.74 0.74
4.32 5.17 1.03
5.98 7.15 1.42
8.27 9.89 1.96
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governing capacities.
As it turns out, the capacity of governments has a posi-
tive effect on the amount of eHealth legislation. The more
resources governments command, the more experience
governments have with legislation of other sectors of the
economy, the more likely they are able to set-up eHealth
legislation.
Sub-system complexity adds to the explanation of vari-
ation between developing countries. Private/business actor
participation has a negative effect on eHealth legislations
while PPPs increase the regulatory level. An explanation
for this result is that business interests in general do not
prefer governmental legislation, but (actively) try to avoid
it. In contrast, PPPs especially add to the expertise of non-
OECD/EU governments. This is an indication for know-
ledge transfer, as propagated by the WHO. Experience
with legislation in other sectors of the economy raises le-
gislation levels. This is in line with reasoning about know-
ledge transfer within government.
Theoretically, my arguments add some new insights to
the literature of policy instrument choice. This paper con-
siders the two main determinants of policy instrument
choice, namely governmental capacities and sub-system
complexity – and evaluates the degree of interrelatedness
in the context of different settings. Governing capacities
are a necessary and sufficient condition for the set-up of
legislations and other policy instruments. This holds true
for all contexts. Sub-system complexity, however, is essen-
tially a sufficient condition since it constrains and enables
policy instrument choice. Sub-system complexity seems
to have various dimensions, of which one is the actor
category. Distinctions must be made between actor cat-
egories that have a constraining effect, such as private
enterprises and donor organizations, and actors such as
PPPs that enable legislation. PPPs have the strongest influ-
ence in capacity-rich settings, in which governments have
experience in regulatory activities as well as in health care.
Furthermore, democratic regimes are more responsive to
PPPs than autocratic regimes. PPPs enhance government
capacities disproportionally in democratic regimes com-
pared to autocratic regimes. In addition, autocracies pro-
vide fewer access points for private interests which
increases the likelihood that government activities are
diverted to other areas and legislation is avoided. This
finding holds true for private enterprises as well as donor
organizations.
At this point, it is necessary to point out the limits of
this study and address further research directions that
might improve the models. Theoretically, the study left
out diffusion effects between countries. The WHO, the
OECD and the EU provide platforms and communica-
tion channels that enable governments to learn from
other countries’ experiences. However, there might bemore direct links between countries that are not medi-
ated by IOs.
Another point that has not been raised is the question
of if some types of health care systems are more probable
to adopt eHealth legislations than other types. Three rea-
sons account for not integrating health system variables
into the hurdle models. First, there are many typologies
and no consensus as to which typology performs best. Sec-
ond, these typologies typically account for OECD countries
and partition them into two broad categories: Bismarck
and Beveridge health care systems. However, there is no
classification that involves most of the non-OECD world.
Third, there is no theoretical model that allows for speci-
fying the differential effects of health care systems on
eHealth. It remains unclear why Bismarck and Beveridge
health care systems should differ in their adoption rates.
However, this is an important topic that directly relates to
the question of technology uptake in health care systems
and should be analyzed in future studies.
Conclusions
This paper has examined a series of research questions
that address the legislation of national eHealth infra-
structure. Does the participation of private organizations
in developing national health infrastructures enhance
the capacity of national governments to regulate these
infrastructures? Does the participation of private organi-
zations make a difference for autocratic or democratic
regimes? What effect does the participation of private
organizations have on governments with low or high
governing capacities?
As it turns out, governing capacity is the key to under-
standing the level of eHealth legislation in developed as
well as developing countries. More capacities and experi-
ence on the part of governments leads to more eHealth le-
gislation. Furthermore, better equipped governments are
less affected by private organizations that are, in general,
less enthusiastic about legislations constraining their activ-
ities. In contrast, more resourceful governments are better
able to make the most of PPPs.
These results yield some practical implications for the
organization of eHealth and development policy. All inter-
national regimes – the WHO, the EU, and the OECD –
promote the participation of private organizations in order
to ensure the construction of national eHealth infrastruc-
ture. This paper shows that the development of (govern-
ment) capacities in the eHealth domain has to be given a
higher priority than the participation of private organiza-
tions, since the existence of some (initial) capacities is the
sine qua non of further capacity building. The best way to
prevent the capture of government by private actors is to
develop expertise within public organizations. External
monitoring by international organizations might be an
additional mechanism of institutional governance but it
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governments.
Additionally, as Buse and Waxman point out, “part-
nerships […] clearly require improved systems of institu-
tional governance. Systems should be established within
public sector agencies to ensure that the greatest pos-
sible importance is attached to protecting the public’s
interest” (Buse & Waxman, 2001: 752). Institutional de-
velopment not only leads to less government capture
but also facilitates knowledge transfer in PPPs. Public or-
ganizations find it easier to learn from private organiza-
tions if they already possess some experience in that
area or have sufficient resources on hand.Endnotes
aThe term and concept eHealth has emerged as a topic
in medicine and public health in the last decade, but has
not entered the social sciences yet. A systematic review
of published definitions by Oh et al. reveals that there
are more than 50 explicit definitions that capture the
use of technology for health care delivery “as a means to
expand, to assist, or to enhance human activities“ [9].
Frequently, eHealth definitions also include notions of
commerce and business activities indicating that the term
emerged from non-medical professionals and now re-
places the older term “telemedicine”, which was originally
used by the medical profession [10]. According to Oh and
colleagues, the most commonly cited definition is the one
developed by Eysenbach.
bAmong them are the Healthcare Information and
Management Systems Society (HIMMS), the International
Medical Informatics Association (IMIA), and the Inter-
national Society for Telemedicine & eHealth (ISfTeH).
cThe European Commission bundled all measures re-
garding information society into a separate action plan,
the eEurope 2002: An information society for all. It fo-
cused on a cheaper, faster and more secure Internet, an
increase of investment in people and skills, and stimulat-
ing Internet use [24]. In 2006, the i2010 initiative was
launched in order to facilitate and contribute to the im-
plementation of the eHealth Action Plan. Its goal is to
provide expert advice for the overarching i2010 High-
Level Group [25].
dIn 1996, the Development Assistance Committee of
the OECD demanded that development partnerships en-
tail technology transfer programs between developing
countries and their development partners [27]. Further-
more, the OECD acknowledged the UN Millennium
Development Goals and searched for ways to deal with
poverty reduction in developing countries. The OECD
worked together with the International Monetary Fund,
the World Bank and the UN to relieve poverty in the
world by promoting technology uptake and diffusion [28].eMissing values have been replaced by estimated values
for these variables: Government surplus/deficit (20.2% miss-
ing values), Labor and credit market regulation (20.2%), Net
official development assistance (ODA) received (27.2%),
Autocracy-Democracy (7.9%), and Physicians (0.9%).
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